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The Beldon Fund was created by John Hunting in 1982 
as a national foundation committed to promoting sound
environmental policies. In 1998, Beldon received a major
infusion of funds from the sale of Hunting’s stock in 
the Steelcase company. Hunting set the foundation on a
new course by deciding to spend all its principal and 
earnings over the next ten years, with the goal of building
a national consensus to achieve and sustain a healthy 
planet. Beldon made its last grants in June 2008 and will
close its doors in June 2009. 
For more information on the Beldon Fund’s program 
strategies, impact, and related lessons and tips for other
funders, visit www.beldon.org.
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PREFACE
When I decided in 1998 to spend the Beldon Fund’s $100 million endowment in 
ten years, the goal was to use these resources to help build public and policy support for
environmental protection. The decision reflected my belief in the urgency of this 
mission and a strong sense that making large investments over a shorter period of time
would be more effective than making smaller grants over many years.  
Setting a limited time horizon shaped decisions about staffing, operations, grant making
and financial investment strategies. It also affected the foundation’s impact. Looking
back on the Beldon Fund’s 10-year arc, and with the benefit of three external evaluations
conducted in our last year, I can see that spending out and focusing on policy change
had a synergistic effect. By spending out, Beldon was able to concentrate the resources
necessary to strengthen environmental advocacy. And by focusing on public policy, 
the foundation’s programs were able to achieve some concrete results that will last long
after our exit. 
As the Beldon Fund prepares to close its doors, I thought it might be helpful to share
with others what we learned from our spend-out experience– the challenges we 
grappled with, the steps we took to address them, and the strategies that worked well 
for us. While this is the particular story of one foundation, I think you will find that 
the lessons are applicable more broadly. 
I hope this monograph will be useful to other philanthropists and philanthropic advisors
–current and prospective–who are interested in exploring the option of spending out, 
or at least spending more, to make a difference. 
It is not meant to be a definitive guide to spending out–additional resources on this
topic are listed at the end and posted on our website. It is, however, a comprehensive
look at how the Beldon Fund handled the practical implications of putting the 
foundation on a spend-out course while seeking to accomplish an ambitious mission. 
The Beldon Fund’s website (www.beldon.org) provides more information on the 
foundation’s program strategies, grantees, lessons from our work and external 
assessments of Beldon’s impact. I hope you will find these materials helpful as you 
each continue your philanthropic journey.
John Hunting, Founder and Chair
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Giving While Living: 
The Beldon Fund Spend-Out Story
INTRODUCTION 
The Beldon Fund was created in 1982 by John Hunting, a longtime environmental philanthropist
and the son of an early executive of Steelcase, the world’s leading manufacturer of office 
furniture. When Steelcase went public in 1997, Hunting sold his stock and endowed Beldon
with $100 million, setting the foundation on a new course.1 He assembled a board of directors
and hired Bill Roberts, a former executive with the Environmental Defense Fund, as Beldon’s 
executive director. At the same time, Hunting committed to spending out all the foundation’s
assets and income in ten years. This decision was in keeping with Hunting’s philanthropic 
philosophy and also reflected his conviction that worsening environmental problems required
urgent attention. In the course of its lifetime, the Beldon Fund spent more than $120 million 
in grants and foundation-directed projects.
Hunting gave four reasons for spending out:
1. Foundations should have a limited lifespan.
Hunting believed strongly that foundations should not
exist in perpetuity and that today’s donors need to
solve today’s problems. He also cautioned that donors
who established their foundations in perpetuity risked
having them captured by trustees who would not 
follow the founder’s intent.
2. Intergenerational transfer of wealth would 
replenish the philanthropic well. In 1998, when
Beldon announced its plan to spend out, the stock 
market was soaring and billions of dollars were 
expected to change hands from an older generation 
of Americans to a younger generation. 
3. A desire to enjoy the results of his philanthropy 
in his lifetime. Hunting was in his late 60s when he
made the decision to spend out Beldon’s assets, and
he wanted to see the results of his giving. He also
believed that a limited time frame helps focus grant
making.
4. Environmental problems can’t wait. Perhaps the
most compelling reason for Beldon’s spending out
was the accelerating pace of environmental destruc-
tion. Global warming had emerged as a major, 
immediate concern–1998 was the hottest year on
record at the time–and Hunting felt that to delay was
to court environmental catastrophe. Saving money 
for future spending, he reasoned, made no sense
when there may be no future.
MISSION: TO ACHIEVE AND SUSTAIN A
HEALTHY PLANET 
Beldon set out to help build a national consensus to
achieve and sustain a healthy planet. The accelerated
timetable for accomplishing this mission shaped decisions
about administrative, staffing, investment and grant-
making strategies. The goal was to build public and 
policy support for environmental protection, and the
needs in the field were many. Environmental advocates
were struggling on multiple fronts to bring change, or
prevent further degradation, in a policy environment
increasingly unfriendly to their goals. 
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Beldon at first staked out a wide grant-making canvas
that included five program areas. Two years into this
work, however, an external evaluation found that the
foundation’s diffuse programs were not likely to yield the
results it hoped to achieve in its limited time frame. 
The findings led Beldon to tighten its focus, moving
from a broad approach to a more finely tuned strategy.
The foundation created a flexible Discretionary Fund 
for opportunistic grants (see page 15) and reduced its
number of grant-making areas to two programs where 
it saw particular potential to make a difference:
• Human Health and the Environment Program
sought to add new and powerful voices to help promote
public policies that prevent or eliminate environmental
risks to people’s health. The program focused on
reform of policies regulating the use of toxic chemicals
in consumer products. 
• Key States Program sought to increase the clout and
policy impact of environmental advocates in five selected
states–Florida, Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina,
and Wisconsin.2 These states presented different policy
contexts, but shared some key characteristics: they 
had a strong environmental ethic but an under-funded
advocacy community, and each had the potential to
mobilize a greater public and policy consensus for
environmental protection. The program’s goal was to
bring change at the state level that would ultimately
help tip the balance towards federal policy reform.
STRATEGY: POSITIONING GRANTEES TO WIN
ON ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
Hunting and the other members of Beldon’s board
believed strongly that achieving and sustaining a healthy
planet required sound environmental policy–and that
advocacy efforts to inform policymaking required
resources. Under the law, public charities have consider-
able leeway to engage in nonpartisan policy research and
education and may advocate for specific policies (though
they may not engage in electioneering or support specific
candidates). Beldon saw nonpartisan advocacy work as an
indispensable tool for the environmental movement and 
a critical counterbalance to the influence of anti-environ-
mental policy groups and their corporate benefactors. 
Beldon’s strategy focused on issues and areas where 
the foundation could have a significant impact within a
decade by helping environmental advocates shift from
playing defense to positioning themselves to win. 
To accomplish this goal, Beldon sought to: 
• Strengthen the infrastructure for environmental 
advocacy. 
• Promote collaboration among environmentalists and
with other advocacy groups whose work complemented
the environmental agenda.
• Bring in new voices for policy change.
• Support sophisticated civic engagement tools and 
tactics that allowed advocates to spotlight their issues
with public officials and conduct nonpartisan voter 
and candidate education.
IN THEIR OWN WORDS
“Having a closing date absolutely focuses the mind. The board and staff feel a sense 
of urgency that’s exhilarating, and being able to go well beyond the required minimum
payout for foundations is hugely positive. We’re more flexible, more nimble, more
opportunistic...If we try something and it doesn’t work, we have to figure out quickly
how to fix it. Not having the luxury of time has largely worked in our favor.” 
Bill Roberts, Beldon Fund executive director
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MAJOR ACHIEVEMENTS 
These two decisions–spending out and focusing on 
public policy–had a synergistic effect. By spending out,
Beldon was able to concentrate the resources necessary
to help shape the field of environmental health and build
a strong infrastructure for environmental advocacy in 
its key states. And by focusing on policy, Beldon was able
to leverage its financial and programmatic investments 
to achieve some concrete results that will outlast the
foundation itself. 
Grant making averaged between $10 and $15 million 
a year.
KEY HIGHLIGHTS:
• Bans on Toxic Chemicals in Consumer Products.
Environmental health issues championed by Beldon
and its grantees are attracting mainstream attention,
largely because of the growing sophistication and 
collaboration of advocates, the engagement of new
allies and growing interest among other funders.
Campaigns to ban toxic chemicals from consumer
products have won scores of state policy victories, led to
a Congressional bill to ban lead and phthalates found
in toys and other children’s products, and paved the
way for comprehensive reform of national policies. 
• Strengthened Environmental Groups Gain
Influence and Policy Victories. The power and clout
of state environmental groups and coalitions funded by
Beldon have grown steadily since 1998. Their collabora-
tive strategies and effective use of new tools to educate
and engage the public have attracted funding from
other donors for specific issue campaigns. Among the
victories for these groups: The Minnesota, Wisconsin,
and Michigan legislatures were among the eight states
that ratified the Great Lakes Compact, a long-sought
agreement to prevent the diversion of water from 
IN THEIR OWN WORDS
Grantee perspective 3
“Dozens of environmental organizations are
much stronger and more strategic then they
were ten years ago, and I think the urgency 
of Beldon’s mission and timeline influenced
this outcome. It led them to focus on
strengthening groups and helping us do what
was needed in order to win.” 
“The Beldon Fund has had a tremendous
impact on our organization. Their support 
has given us the credibility to develop and
demonstrate new collaborative approaches
that would not have been done without their
support. These approaches have resulted 
in significant real-world progress on the
issues that drive our mission.”
the Great Lakes. In North Carolina, environmental 
coalitions had a series of policy victories, including
clean drinking water and landfill legislation, power
plant regulation and the creation of a global warming
commission. Advocacy organizations in these states 
are stronger, more effective, and well-positioned to 
continue their policy-oriented work after Beldon’s exit. 
FROM START-UP TO SUNSET: HOW MANY
YEARS TO SPEND OUT?
The Beldon Fund is not the first foundation to spend out.
But it is one of the few to make the decision to spend 
out at its inception. In doing so, Beldon had to address
the many issues endemic to new foundations – creating 
a board, hiring staff, setting up an office, establishing
operational systems, deciding program strategy and grant
guidelines–while also contending with the urgency of
spending out.
This begs the question: Is ten years enough time? 
The answer depends on each foundation’s goals,
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resources, history, culture, asset level and tolerance for
risk. In Beldon’s case, the foundation arguably could
have used a few more years. 
Consider the trajectory: 
• In its first two years Beldon hired staff, built the board,
organized its office space and operations and developed
and launched its grant making programs. 
• During the next four years, external evaluations led to
mid-course corrections in administrative procedures
and program focus.
• By its sixth year Beldon was operating smoothly 
on all fronts.
• In year nine, the foundation began its two-year phase
out, making its last grants June 2008.
LEARNING FROM BELDON’S 
SPEND-OUT STORY
Beldon’s decision to establish a clear end date set the
course for its strategy and operations. Decisions about
investment, staffing, programs, and preparing grantees
for Beldon’s exit all flowed from the simple fact that an
immutable closing date existed on the horizon. In the
end, history will be the final judge of whether or not the
Beldon Fund was fully successful in achieving its goals. 
This monograph focuses on how the Beldon Fund 
managed the nuts and bolts of spending out. 
• How does having a sunset date 
affect program strategy? 
• What is the appropriate way to staff 
a spend-out foundation? 
• How do you manage assets? 
• And how do you prepare grantees 
for the foundation’s exit? 
Though it draws on historical materials–reports, strategy
papers, financial models, written policies and external 
evaluations– the context and insights of this document
come from interviews with key staff members, grantees,
John Hunting, and board members. 
The following chapters examine the three areas where
spend out had the greatest consequences: finance, opera-
tions and program. While much of this story is unique to
Beldon, many of the lessons and themes are applicable
more broadly. Other philanthropists, current and
prospective, might find Beldon’s experience instructive 
as they consider whether spending out–or spending
more– is the right path for them. ■




For the majority of traditional foundations, managing the endowment is relatively straightfor-
ward: Invest for maximum returns over the long term, pay out 5 percent each year and 
recalibrate payout each year using the IRS-mandated three-year average. Asset allocations vary
from foundation to foundation, of course, but this, in a nutshell, is the general strategy.
Perpetuity gives foundations the luxury of investing in assets with long time horizons–venture
capital funds, private equity, small-cap stocks–since they can ride out market swings and
achieve a higher overall return. An entire industry of fund advisors and money managers has
grown up around this strategy.
The Beldon Fund faced a different challenge: How to manage an endowment with 
a limited investment horizon while also maintaining a consistent level of support for grantees?
This chapter takes a closer look at how the foundation addressed this challenge.
THE BELDON FUND’S INVESTMENT
STRATEGY EVOLVES
When the Beldon Fund first announced its plan to spend
out the endowment over the next ten years, the initial
financial strategy was to structure spending with modest
payouts in the early years, ramping up to more robust
grant making in the middle years, with a slow decrease
in spending during the final years. From 1998 to 2001,
the portfolio contained a fairly conventional mix of 
equities and bonds, though weighted towards the latter.
Following the stock market downturn in 1999, however,
it became clear that while the foundation had not lost
money, investment performance was not keeping up
with the grant-making goals.
But more important were the changes occurring on the
program side. In 2001, Beldon set out to re-think its pro-
grams, staffing and operations. The foundation cut the
number of program areas from five to two, committed to
making larger multi-year grants, and set aside one-third
of its grant-making budget for a Discretionary Fund. 
MANAGING ASSETS LIKE A RETIREE 
ON A FIXED INCOME
Given these two forces– the portfolio’s under-perform-
ance and the new grant-making strategy– it became clear
that the foundation needed to rethink its entire invest-
ment strategy and budgeting process. As Beldon evolved,
the aggressive grant-making strategy ended up driving 
a rather conservative investment strategy. Ultimately, the
risk profile looked very much like a retiree’s portfolio.
From the outset, the investment committee outlined two
goals for the foundation’s money managers:
• Predictable Returns. If the foundation was going 
to meet its program goals, it needed to know how much
money it would have to spend over the course of the
foundation’s life.
• Limited Volatility. Whereas perpetual foundations
could recover from a market downturn by adjusting
grant budgets while the market recovered, Beldon’s short
time frame precluded the ride-it-out option.
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MOVING INTO HEDGE FUNDS 
With these goals in mind, COO Azade Ardali, who had
joined the foundation in 2001, asked Beldon’s money
managers to look at investment instruments that could
deliver predictable returns of 7.8 percent but would be
budgeted conservatively for returns of 5.5 percent. After
considering a number of options, they recommended
that the Beldon Fund consider market-neutral hedge
funds. 
Hunting and the board finance committee agreed to
investigate this option. Over the next six months, Beldon
and its money managers looked at more than 35 funds
before selecting three funds of funds to invest in. By the
end of 2002, the foundation had moved 30 percent of its
assets into hedge funds. Forty percent of the foundation’s
assets were in bonds, the rest in equities–an allocation
that helped Beldon achieve a modest 0.8 percent return
for a year in which the S&P tumbled 22 percent. 
BUILDING AN INVESTMENT STRATEGY 
FOR SPEND OUT
Although Beldon’s investment strategy evolved–at times
unevenly–to meet its specific grant-making needs, the
foundation, like a worker approaching retirement, needed
predictable returns and low volatility so it could meet its
grant-making obligations. What it discovered:
• Endowment-Management is Set Up to Support 
Perpetuity. As a spend-out foundation, Beldon strug-
gled to find investment products suited to its needs.
Allocation models are set up for perpetuity, and it took
some persuasion to move financial advisors away from
that framework.
BELDON FUND INVESTMENT STRATEGY
• Spend Out Requires New Financial Models.
Convincing Beldon’s money managers to develop
spend-out strategies ultimately meant more work for
them. But in the end, both parties benefited. The finan-
cial advisory team was able to repackage the research 
it did around hedge funds–which, at the time, were
still relatively new investment vehicles – and sell it to
other clients. And Beldon got the market-neutral
investment tools it needed.
“LANDING THE AIRPLANE”: 
BUDGETING FOR SPEND OUT
When Beldon refocused its program areas in 2001, the
revised strategy called for substantial, multi-year grants in
its Key States Program. Poised to put millions of dollars
into each of the key states over the coming years, the foun-
dation needed to create a corresponding budget process
that would allow Beldon to meet its multi-year commit-
ments while also keeping the finances on course for a
smooth landing at the time of its exit. It was akin to setting
an airplane down on a narrow runway after a long flight. 
LONG-RANGE PLANNING 
One of the first steps was to develop a budget forecast for
the foundation’s remaining years. By 2002, the founda-
tion had a detailed, long-range financial plan for both
operations and grant making that ran through 2009. On
the operations side, Beldon calculated annual expendi-
tures, down to office supplies. On the program side, staff
developed grant-making budgets based on likely-case,
best-case, and worst-case scenarios. Once expense and
income projections had been established, the foundation
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12/31/99 12/31/00 12/31/01 12/31/02 12/31/03 12/31/04 12/31/05 12/31/06 12/31/07 12/31/08
Cash 5,818,346 4,347,708 8,136,668 2,150,899 2,092,105 1,886,480 83,236 13,558,346 11,148,899  5,989,283 
Hedge Mkt Ntrl —   —   —   24,562,956 19,224,112 21,576,245 21,418,101 17,737,523 8,897,477 —
Fixed Income 63,478,974 62,619,396 59,325,546 30,623,919 24,573,812 23,122,158 17,056,157 641,513 —   —
Steelcase 20,645,052 16,522,641 1,731,381 —   —   —   —   —   —   —
Intl Equity 2,749,488 4,245,920 5,340,809 5,423,571 7,272,743 4,041,640 2,230,969 —   —   —
SC Equity 3,472,363 5,803,979 6,852,516 5,559,624 8,047,954 3,764,797 2,214,844 —   —   —
LC Equity 2,449,209 4,100,453 5,686,644 5,572,945 7,123,031 4,063,502 2,433,198 1,044,619 527 —
TOTAL $98,613,432 $97,640,097 $87,073,564 $73,893,914 $68,333,757 $58,454,822 $45,436,505 $32,982,001 $20,046,903 $5,989,283
BELDON FUND HISTORICAL ASSET ALLOCATION
ANNUAL “TRUE UPS” 
While the fiscal plan offered a solid framework for asset
allocation and spending projections, the foundation 
conducted an annual “true up”–a top-to-bottom review that
reconciled projected expenditures and returns with actual
expenditures and returns–to map out a financial plan for
the remaining years. Long-term budgeting involves a lot of
guess work, and the true-up process kept things on track.
One of the principal benefits of the annual true up was
that it allowed the foundation to make real-time adjust-
ments to its grant-making strategy. Because Beldon was
working over an eight- or nine-year arc, and because the
foundation did the annual true up, it had the tools in
place to maintain multi-year grants, though a major hit
to the foundation’s assets might have reduced spending
over the long term. 
PRECISE YEARLY PROJECTIONS 
OF NET ASSETS 
Here’s how the true-up process worked. Starting in the
last quarter of 2002, Beldon calculated total grants expen-
ditures and administrative expenses through the end 
of the year. The goal was to calculate the foundation’s 
projected net assets as of January 1 of the following year.
Using that figure as a starting point, it then calculated
annual operating expenditures for the foundation’s
remaining years. Fixed expenses – rent, equipment 
purchases, equipment leases – were easy to calculate.
Variable expenses – salaries and benefits, utilities, 
telecommunications – were indexed to inflation and
adjusted to account for the winnowing of staff.
With two numbers in mind–net assets and operating
expenditures–Beldon’s executive team would run 10-20
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different spending scenarios based on different grants
expenditures and different projected levels of return. 
The finance committee, in consultation with an outside
economics expert, decided the projected rate of return.
More grant funds going out in the coming fiscal year, 
for instance, would give the foundation less to spend in
subsequent years because there would be less to invest.
Conversely, lower levels of grant making could yield
higher levels in subsequent years. 
FINDING A GRANT-MAKING 
COMFORT LEVEL 
There were two complementary goals behind this strategy.
First, Beldon needed to find a level of grant making that
supported its program goals and commitments. Second, it
needed to ensure that the foundation did not run out of
money in the final year. Over its final three-and-a-half
years, Beldon moved to quarterly true ups, with detailed
cash-flow analysis. In 2008, for instance, Beldon
increased spending three times: First, because its income
had surpassed 2007 projections; second, because its
hedge-fund investments weathered the overall downturn
in the first half of 2008; and third, because the founda-
tion developed a more accurate assessment of its final
grant to the Tides Foundation, which was selected to
receive Beldon’s remaining assets at the time of closing.
DON’T FORGET A SCENARIO 
THAT EXCEEDS YOUR 
BEST-CASE PROJECTIONS 
As the Beldon Fund developed its spend-out strategy,
there was always a plan in place for handling lower 
than expected returns. If that happened, Beldon would
amortize the lost income over the remaining life of 
the foundation and avoid drastic year-to-year fluctuations
in the grants budget.
One of the ironies of Beldon’s experience, however, 
is that the foundation actually had more money to spend
in its later years than initially projected. Looking back,
the projections may have been too conservative. The
Beldon team came to realize that it should have had a
plan in place for spending higher-than-expected returns.
Although Beldon managed to spend the money by raising
subsequent years’ grants budgets, members of the staff
and board concede that they could have been more
thoughtful and strategic if they had also planned for a
less conservative best-case scenario.
The take-away? Financial projection should be conservative
by nature, but prudence can yield higher than expected
returns. And when that happens, foundations should
have a plan in place to spend it wisely. ■
KEYS TO DEVELOPING A SPEND-OUT BUDGET
A spend-out foundation does not have the luxury of a three-year rolling average 
of 5 percent payout. So how do you develop a fiscal plan? Here are some tips:
• Develop a comprehensive financial plan—with expense and income projections—that 
covers the life of the foundation.
• Revisit early and often and adjust as necessary to sustain grant making commitments 
and ensure the foundation does not run out of money in the final year.
• Develop spending plans for different scenarios—best case, likely case, worst case.
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CASTING CALL: ASSEMBLING AN EFFECTIVE
FOUNDATION STAFF 
As a theater aficionado, John Hunting has a favorite 
saying: “Ninety percent of the success of a show is in the
casting.” As part of its programmatic shift, Beldon real-
ized that it needed to have fewer but more senior-level
staff to run its newly focused program areas. By 2003, it
had reduced staff from 15 to nine, and hired Anita Nager,
previously a senior program officer for community 
development and the environment at The New York
Community Trust, as director of programs. The founda-
tion also engaged two senior-level consultants to provide
additional expertise. Because of the short time frame,
Beldon did not have the luxury of hiring inexperienced
staff and helping them cultivate skills. Rather, the foun-
dation needed seasoned professionals with the skills,
experience and networks necessary to develop and 
implement plans immediately. While hiring top-shelf 
talent might seem like an extravagance for a foundation
with only $100 million in assets, Beldon was making
grants like a foundation three-times its size, and it needed
a staffing structure to support that level of spending. 
On the program side, two overlapping issues contributed
to the need for experienced staff members:
• Sophisticated Strategies Require Experienced
People to Execute Them. Experienced grant makers
helped Beldon navigate the sometimes rocky shoals of
advocacy coalition politics and helped the foundation
build strong relationships with other funders. They did
not have to learn the basics of good grant making while
simultaneously trying to envision the underlying 
strategy. Their years of grant making gave senior staff
an almost intuitive sense of what was possible, how to
get things done, the best way to coax partners and how
to make sure they did not push too hard.
• Bringing Other Funders to the Field. Recruiting
other funders to Beldon’s program areas was critical for
two reasons. First, the issues and strategies were 
cutting edge, which meant there were few funders that
grantees could turn to. Second, Beldon’s financial 
support for these pioneering grantees was on a ticking
clock, which meant that other funders would have to
step in to replace this support. While a number of
foundations seek to attract other funders to their work,
it is an absolute necessity for a spend-out foundation. 
In many cases, staff members’ roles in field-building and
relationship-brokering were one and the same. For
instance, when chemicals policy became a priority issue
for the Human Health and Environment Program, 
Anita Nager, Beldon’s director of programs, stepped in to
co-chair the Health and Environmental Funders Network,
a group of grant makers committed to funding at the
As a spend-out foundation, The Beldon Fund faced a range of operational issues. How do you hire
good people when they know that they will be out of a job in ten years–or less? How do you retain
staff as the end draws near? What should be done with remaining assets and a decade’s worth 
of archival materials? These are just a handful of the questions the Beldon Fund grappled with
throughout its spend out.
Operations–Stafﬁng 
for Spend Out and 
Preparing to Close the Doors
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IN THEIR OWN WORDS
On Working at a Spend-Out Foundation 
“I left a really good job with great security 
to join Beldon. Over the years, I had developed
a wonderful program at my previous job, 
but there was a real excitement and challenge
to Beldon’s venture, particularly the prospect
of being there on the ground floor to build
something. You have this incredible freedom
do things differently. Even the simplest
things—how you present materials to your
board—as well as the more complicated, 
how you engage grantees in building a new
field and working with each other, become
opportunities.
I knew what the arc of the foundation’s spend
out would look like, but I didn’t know what
twists and turns it would take along the way.
As challenging as it was to set goals and try
to meet them within the foundation’s limited
time frame, it was also a major attraction.” 
Anita Nager, director of programs 
intersection of environment and health. Beldon was also
active in the Environmental Grant Makers Association,
organizing panels at retreats and helping to build a 
network of fellow grant makers. Given this high level of
work, it was essential to have staff members with the
relationships, experience and gravitas necessary to draw
in other funders.
It wasn’t just that Beldon’s senior staff were more per-
suasive or had more extensive contacts. The key was that
they provided real value to their foundation colleagues.
Many program officers are stretched thin, as Beldon’s
had been before the foundation scaled back its pro-
grams. They not only have to keep up with the groups in
their portfolio, they also need to keep abreast of what’s
going on in their field. Beldon’s staff members were
extremely valuable to their peers because they could do
some of this leg work. In addition, they were able to
demonstrate the viability of certain grant making
approaches. Several funders looked at Beldon programs
that were working well and determined that these 
could be worthwhile investments for their foundations 
as well.
ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Beldon benefited, as well, from a board of directors,
handpicked by John Hunting, who were experts in envi-
ronmental advocacy and philanthropy and shared the
foundation’s commitment to bringing change. They were
also active practitioners– including several other funders,
in particular the executive directors of the Bauman
Foundation and John Merck Fund–who became funding
partners and were helpful in reaching out to other 
foundations. 
SPEND OUT AS A LURE FOR TALENT
One of the ironies of Beldon’s spend-out story is the 
fact that attracting talented professionals proved to be
much easier than many outsiders might have expected.
Here’s why:
• A Unique Opportunity. To many of the senior staff
members who eventually joined the foundation, Beldon
represented a singular professional opportunity 
to design new programs and create an administrative
structure that would support this work within the 
ten-year time frame. For instance, after the foundation’s
first external evaluation led to changes in program
strategy, COO Ardali oversaw a near top-to-bottom 
reinvention of operations–creating a new budgeting
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process, hiring new administrative staff and auditors,
restructuring Beldon’s benefits package and realigning
salaries and benefits to make them more competitive
within the foundation community.
• Vibrant, Entrepreneurial Culture. Part of the 
opportunity Beldon offered was rooted in its vibrant,
entrepreneurial culture. Staff members had a lot of
authority for their areas and they were encouraged to
take risks. As a consequence, Beldon was able to 
attract even better professionals–adventuresome and
creative– than it might have otherwise. 
• Shared Mission with a Living Donor. Several staff
members noted that working with a living donor 
created a sense of camaraderie and shared mission that
was particularly inspiring. Finding ways to meet 
John Hunting’s programmatic goals added an exciting
dimension to the work. Part of this had to do with
Hunting’s personal qualities, his passion for the issues
and support for new approaches, which attracted 
talented staff. Beldon’s board members, who shared
the foundation’s values and sense of urgency, also 
contributed to the infectious esprit de corps.
INTO THE TWILIGHT: RETAINING STAFF 
AS THE SUNSET NEARS
While attracting staff to the Beldon Fund may have 
been easier than expected, the foundation also faced the 
challenge of retaining them as the foundation sunset
date neared. Yet this, too, proved easier than expected.
Executive Director Bill Roberts attributes Beldon’s 
success in this area to the same qualities that drew 
people to the foundation in the first place. But Beldon
took specific steps to reinforce the attraction:
MANAGING STAFF IN THE FINAL MONTHS
All good things must come to an end. For Beldon, as with any foundation, one of the biggest
challenges was ensuring that key personnel stick around until the last day. Here’s how 
they did it:
1. Communicate Staffing Plans Clearly and Early. With the final round of grants slated for
June 2008, the board and executive team laid out an attrition plan in early 2007. They 
slated four people to leave by September 2008 and the remainder to stay until the final day. 
2. Help People Find Their Next Job. Staff members were given plenty of warning, 
networking assistance and significant leeway in finding their next job.
3. Create Incentives to Retain Key People. Beldon provided modest financial incentives 
to encourage people to stay until the end. 
4. Be Flexible in Letting People Go. The foundation was practical enough to recognize that
people would leave earlier than expected. 
5. Consider Hiring Senior-Level Consultant Back-up. Beldon placed a consultant on retainer
its last year to serve as a “utility infielder” should a staff member leave earlier than 
anticipated and to back up remaining staff.
13 • THE BELDON FUND
• Pay People Competitively. John Hunting and the
board elected to compensate people reasonably–not 
extravagantly, but well. Beldon compared its compensa-
tion levels to foundations with similar payout rates
(rather than similar asset size) and set salaries in the
middle range. 
• Communicate Plans for Staff Attrition and Help
in the Transition Out. Beginning in early 2007,
Beldon’s board and executive team laid out a clear plan
for handling staff transitions over the next 18 months.
Everyone was encouraged to communicate openly
about plans and potential opportunities. The mantra to
staff members was: Let the foundation know when an
opportunity comes up–not after accepting a job offer.
Meanwhile, as staff grew smaller and smaller in the
final years, remaining members had to take on 
multiple roles.
CLOSING THE DOORS: OPERATIONAL
CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FINAL DAYS
As the Beldon Fund wound down, the foundation faced 
a set of practical questions. Who will oversee operations
in the final months? What should be done with a
decade’s worth of archival material? What should the
foundation do with any remaining assets? And how
should the foundation’s impact be assessed down the
road? 
Here is how Beldon answered these questions:
• Staffing the Closing. Beldon made its last grants in
June 2008 and allowed a full year afterwards to wind
down the foundation’s operations and communicate its
results and lessons before closing the doors. Beldon
placed a senior-level consultant on retainer from
September 2008 through the end of 2009–someone to
fill the gap should a staff member leave earlier than
anticipated and to back up remaining staff members.
A former senior advisor to another spend out founda-
tion, the consultant brought unique qualities to the table
but mostly functioned as an insurance policy to support
a smooth closing.
• Archives. After considering several options, Beldon
decided to house its archives at the Center on Philan-
thropy at Indiana University. The choice was made
three years before closing to allow sufficient time to
work with the archivist to identify and prepare materi-
als for the transfer. The center was selected because it
had an excellent reputation and top-notch facility, and a
particular interest in Beldon’s archives–both because
of the foundation’s spend-out experience and the fact
that its funds originally came from a Midwestern 
corporation. As an added attraction, John Hunting
thought the center might be a good place to consolidate
the archives from his other philanthropic funds as 
well as his family’s historical records. 
• Disposal of Assets. Beldon chose to transfer all
remaining assets at the time of its closing as a grant to
the Tides Foundation, which will administer and 
dispense the funds subject to a grant agreement letter.
Tides was selected for several reasons. As a national
public charity that provides professional philanthropic
services, it is equipped to manage grant making and
related tasks. In addition, John Hunting maintained 
a separate donor-advised fund at Tides for many years
and had confidence in its management and the 
compatibility of its mission. 
• Final Evaluation. At the final board meeting in June
2008, Beldon’s board set aside resources to design and
execute an evaluation of the foundation’s nonpartisan
civic engagement work that would be completed a year
after the last grants were made. (See page 19). ■
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At the program level, a sunset date carries its own set of advantages and challenges. On the 
one hand, having a closing date creates a sense of institutionalized urgency to accomplish the 
foundation’s goals and can lead to bolder grant making that achieves greater impact. On the
other hand, a spend-out foundation has a smaller margin of error because it has less time to
learn from its mistakes. How can a spend-out foundation experiment and take risks while also
making necessary adjustments to keep its work on track? How can it fund unexpected opportunities
when exigencies of spending down require focus and discipline? How does the foundation ensure
that its work in a particular field carries on after the doors close? And how can a foundation 
best position grantees for its eventual exit? These are some of the key issues the Beldon Fund
struggled with as its programs evolved over the spend-out period.
Developing a 
Program Strategy
THE EVOLUTION OF BELDON’S PROGRAM
STRATEGY
Spend out had two central implications for the Beldon
Fund’s program strategy. 
• The underlying sense of urgency about environmen-
tal issues led the foundation to fund innovative, sophis-
ticated advocacy and policy reform strategies. But it also
led the foundation, in its early years, to take on too
many programs.
• At the same time, the foundation’s 10-year time
frame meant that it had a smaller margin of error than
a perpetual foundation because it had less time to learn 
from its mistakes and make appropriate adjustments. 
The tension between Beldon’s aggressive program goals, 
the reality of what it could accomplish given its limited
time frame and financial resources, and the need to 
reconcile the two successfully, became a defining force 
in Beldon’s evolving program strategy.
From the outset, the Beldon Fund took a fairly aggressive
posture toward its program goals. To begin with, the 
foundation’s strategies–supporting environmental 
advocacy and policy reform–were fairly cutting edge. But
two years into the 10-year spend-out period, it became
clear that the foundation was spread too thin with its five
program areas. The foundation was inundated with grant
applications, and many of them were from organizations
that were not a good fit. In 1999, for instance, Beldon
received 386 applications and awarded 18 grants–a 4.6
percent funding rate. In addition, staff members were
slow to respond to grant applicants, which delayed the
paperwork on actual grants. 
EVALUATION BRINGS CHANGE
In order to address these problems, Beldon hired an 
outside evaluation firm in 2001 to conduct a nuts and
bolts assessment of the foundation’s operations, adminis-
trative procedures and programs. The foundation also 
conducted an anonymous “customer satisfaction survey” of
grantees and grant-seekers. The assessment led the foun-
dation to tighten administrative procedures, reconfigure
the staff and narrow the program focus to its two areas,
Human Health and the Environment and Key States.
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ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM 
On the administrative level, the foundation asked grant
applicants to send a letter of inquiry before submitting a
full grant application. If the proposed project was consid-
ered a good fit, the organization was asked to submit a
full proposal; if not, the foundation notified the prospect
within a month. Over the next few years, the number 
of off-the-mark proposals fell dramatically–a sign that
Beldon was communicating more effectively with
prospective grantees. Going forward, the ratio of grant
applicants to funded proposals became a key metric: 
The higher the ratio of proposals to funded projects, the
clearer and more responsive the foundation was being
with prospective grantees.
PLANNING FOR THE UNEXPECTED: 
CREATING A DISCRETIONARY FUND
Beldon had always set aside a portion of its assets for 
discretionary projects, which, though aligned with the
foundation’s mission and goals, did not fit neatly into
one of its program areas. But following the 2001 
evaluation, the board decided to formalize and expand
the discretionary funding pool to roughly one-third 
of the grants budget. Discretionary Fund projects had 
to achieve one of the following goals:
• Strengthen the capacity of the environmental 
community to develop successful techniques for 
civic engagement.
• Provide improved capacity for grantees to diversify 
and increase their fund-raising in order to “fill the
hole” when Beldon completed grant making.
• Respond to opportunities or critical needs that advance
Beldon’s overall program goals.
In hindsight, creating the Discretionary Fund proved to
be one of the wisest decisions the foundation made 
over the course of its spend out. The Discretionary Fund
played a number of important roles:
• Provided Flexibility to Respond Quickly to
Emerging Opportunities. For instance, in 2001 the
Discretionary Fund made grants to several national
environmental organizations that helped them create
the Collaborative Environment Campaign, which used
a flexible pool of funds to respond to immediate threats
to environmental protections. The project, supported
by several foundations, involved prominent national
environmental groups that could collectively decide on
the use of the pooled funds. Their first effort focused
on opposing the administration’s proposed opening of
the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to oil exploration.
In mid-2000, the House voted to allow drilling, but the
Senate later rejected the measure. Subsequent bills
have also failed.
• Served as a Conduit for Funding Other Issues
and Groups. When the foundation sought to expand
the state level coalitions in its Key States Program, 
for example, the Discretionary Fund provided a pool of
money to support advocacy groups that were not 
environmental organizations, but whose nonpartisan
civic engagement programs to educate voters comple-
mented the environmental agenda. 
• Provided Resources for Fundraising Capacity-
Building Work with Grantees. Beldon offered national
and regional fund-raising training for the board and 
staff of grantee organizations, and supplemental fund-
ing to help select groups implement what they had
learned in the training sessions. (See page 20).
• Provided Elasticity to Annual Grant Making
Budget. These resources were also applied to special
IN THEIR OWN WORDS
Grantee Perspective 
“Beldon had a big impact by seeding some 
of our projects, which then made other 
foundations feel less nervous. The staff was 
wonderful at bringing other funders to the
table and helping to provide a sense of
urgency and importance to their (and our)
change-related goals.” 
“Beldon, and especially [our program officer]
provided insights about related projects
nationally, included us in network building,
connected us to additional resources, 
and advised us on informational resources
and good models.”
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Beldon also provided financial support to all three 
organizations totaling $552,000, not including annual
membership fees. 
Beldon is widely viewed as playing a catalytic role in the
funding community, helping to shape the conversation
among fellow grant makers about effective strategies,
trends in the field and opportunities to increase the
impact of grant making. As a foundation that worked
across three different fields–environment, health and
civic engagement–Beldon was able to build bridges,
share insights and make connections between people
and ideas. And by demonstrating the viability of certain
grant making strategies, particularly support of more
sophisticated civic engagement tools and tactics, Beldon
inspired some other funders to test the waters.
PEER-TO-PEER FUNDER NETWORKING 
Actual funding partners emerged from the peer-to-peer 
networking that Beldon staff undertook with other 
funders, individually and in groups. In 2004 and 2005,
opportunities that emerged from the Key States 
and Health and Environment programs. Although
grant-making discipline is essential for a spend-out
foundation, sands shift unexpectedly and new opportu-
nities arise. Setting aside money allowed Beldon to
seize opportunities when they came along. For example,
when public concern over consumer product safety
peaked during the 2007 holiday season with reports of
lead paint in children’s toys, Beldon was able to offer
additional resources to grantees working on reform of
toxic chemicals policies. The funds helped coordinate
state-level advocacy efforts that included toy testing,
creation of data bases, and communication with the
public and media.
HELPING TO SHAPE THE CONVERSATION:
ENGAGING OTHER FUNDERS 
The final piece of the programmatic adjustment Beldon
undertook in 2001 was a new emphasis on encouraging
other funders to support this kind of work. Indeed, one
of the foundation’s internal benchmarks became the
extent to which other funders were beginning to invest in
Beldon’s issue areas and grantees. 
ASSUMING LEADERSHIP ROLES
In the wake of its first evaluation, the foundation
replaced some of its junior staff members and brought 
in senior-level staff and consultants, people with the 
reputations, experience and relationships necessary to
develop the field. Over the next eight years, Beldon’s 
program staff assumed leadership roles in several key
funders’ networks–Environmental Grant Makers
Association, the Funders Committee for Civic Participa-
tion and the Health and Environmental Funders Net-
work. Through funder briefings, reports, brainstorming
and conferences, Beldon helped lay the intellectual
groundwork for attracting other funders to its work.
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Beldon staff convened environmental health colleagues
to collaborate on efforts to reform chemicals policy.
These funders pooled their resources to survey the field,
fully staff the Health and Environmental Funders
Network, engage new donors and collaborate in their
grant making. In addition, in 2008 a group of funders
working at the intersection of environmental policy and
civic engagement created the State Funders Caucus 
at the Funders Committee for Civic Participation. Beldon
provided $225,000 in seed funding for the caucus, 
which will carry on the work of building capacity among
state environmental groups.
ROLE OF EVALUATION: MAKING MID-COURSE
CORRECTIONS AND FINAL ASSESSMENTS
Recognizing the importance of making timely mid-
course corrections, Beldon invested heavily in evaluation.
In 2003, and again in 2004 and 2005, Beldon hired 
a trio of consultants to evaluate each of the three 
programs. They interviewed scores of grantees, grant
makers and other stakeholders, with an eye to identifying
challenges, fleshing out a roadmap to address them and
developing benchmarks for measuring progress.
This process, while somewhat time-intensive, was cost-
effective. Evaluations of three programs cost $150,000,
from an annual $14.5 million grants budget. More impor-
tantly, the evaluations allowed the foundation to make
critical adjustments to strategy. Drawing on anonymous
assessments from grantees, evaluators were able to give
Beldon unvarnished feedback on what was working–and
what was not. For example:
• Respondents to the Health and Environment
Program evaluation felt that the foundation did 
a good job of identifying the best environmental 
advocates, but there was little coordination of efforts 
in the field and no consistent policy alignment. 
As a result, Beldon selected chemical policy reform 
as its signature issue and organized grantees and 
philanthropic partners around this central theme. 
KEYS TO FIELD-BUILDING
• Establish Leadership. Leadership based on expertise and demonstrable results can
attract other funders to your work.
• Cultivate Other Funders. Peer-to-peer networking helps position other funders to take
over as field leaders and supporters of key grantees.
• Invest in Funder Networks. Funder networks will provide important infrastructure that
can sustain your work after you’re gone, so invest in them early on.
• Invest in Grantee Networks. Provide peer learning opportunities that will foster 
productive relationships among grantees. 
• Capture Stories and Distill Lessons. Sharing what you learn along the way builds the
field’s knowledge base and will help strengthen your own and other funders’ grant making.
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• At the same time, the Key States evaluation led
Beldon to support organizations and programs that
sought to connect environmental advocates to other
advocacy groups with complementary policy agendas. 
• The Discretionary Fund focused on beefing up this
nonpartisan civic participation work–and also began
preparing grantees for Beldon’s exit by building their
fund-raising capacity.
• The evaluations led Beldon to look for synergies
between its major programs–a strategy that took 
advantage of staff members’ complementary skills and
knowledge while also achieving economies of scale 
in grant making.
CAVEAT—TOO MUCH OF A GOOD THING?
While Beldon made effective use of evaluation findings, 
in retrospect it concluded that it could have allowed more
time between the assessments of its program strategies.
Annual evaluations proved burdensome for grantees 
and did not reveal significantly new information to guide
Beldon’s grant making. 
FINAL EVALUATIONS
In its last year of grant making, Beldon funded three 
TIPS ON ACHIEVING IMPACT IN A LIMITED TIME FRAME
• Learn Quickly. Having a sunset date means there’s limited time to learn from mistakes and
adjust course.
• Use Evaluation to Refine Strategy. Develop programmatic benchmarks of success and 
use external evaluations to assess progress. An evaluation that looks at the overall impact
of program strategies, rather than just individual grants, will indicate if you’re on the 
right track or need to make changes. 
• Keep a Tight Focus. It’s better to start with a few areas where you are likely to make a 
difference than to take on too many issues and then have to pare down.
• Be Bold. Develop or adopt innovative strategies geared to bring change within a limited
time frame.
• Manage Risk. Taking chances can lead to breakthrough solutions, but not all bets pay off.
Learn from those that don’t work out and move on. 
• Look for Synergy Across Program Areas. Develop a strategy early on to connect, where
possible, the work of major programs to achieve greater scale and deeper impact.
• Ensure Budget Flexibility. Allocate assets to allow flexibility to respond to unanticipated
funding opportunities or critical needs in the field.
• Build the Field. Hire staff members who can bring other funders to the work. 
• Use All the Foundation’s Resources—Not Just Money. Capitalize on staff’s issue expertise,
funder connections and ability to serve as a sounding board for problems and ideas.
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Given the many variables that shape the outcome of 
an advocacy campaign or the trajectory of a particular
policy reform, Beldon’s evaluations focused on the over-
all success of its strategies, not on the efficacy of indi-
vidual grants or grantees. The board was content to
have grantees build a coalition capable of exerting pres-
sure on policy makers–even if the coalition won only
half of what it was hoping for in any given campaign. 
By necessity a qualitative survey, the portfolio evalua-
tion was designed with 360-degree input from a wide
range of stakeholders. Through the evaluations, Beldon
was able to establish a set of performance benchmarks
for success based on whether its programs were
increasing the effectiveness of its grantees and drawing
more resources to the field as a whole. The foundation
recognized that policies are shaped by the alchemy of
good organizing, sound ideas, clout, and factors that
are beyond the control of advocates. Beldon’s strategy
focused on strengthening the first three so groups
would be well-positioned to take advantage of policy
opportunities. 
Here are some of the indicators the foundation 
developed to measure the impact of its portfolios:
GRANTEE OUTCOMES
• Human Health and the Environment:
• Broadening the base of the environmental 
movement to include health professionals and
health-affected groups.
• Engaging champions in governors’ offices and state
legislatures, leading to concrete policy victories. 
• Increasing public debate over grantees’ core issues.
• Key States:
• Increasing power and clout of environmental 
advocates in Key States.
• Demonstrating ability to mobilize supporters. 
• Working with nontraditional allies to build 
civic engagement.
• Overall: 
• Engaging other funders to support Beldon grantees.
• Diversifying income streams.
POLICY OUTCOMES
• Policy victories.
• Champions in public and private sectors.
• Coordination among grantees.
• Consistency of messages among grantees.
EVALUATING POLICY ADVOCACY GRANT-MAKING STRATEGIES
external evaluations–anonymous grantee and grant
applicant perception surveys conducted by the Center 
for Effective Philanthropy, and a qualitative assessment 
of the foundation’s work conducted by a team of external
consultants (all are available at: www.beldon.org ). 
At the final board meeting in June 2008, Beldon’s board
set aside resources to design and execute an evaluation of
the foundation’s nonpartisan civic engagement work that
would be completed a year after the last grants were
made. Beldon also asked its evaluators to design 
an evaluation that could be conducted several years
after the foundation’s exit. The later evaluation would
assess the extent to which the foundation’s invest-
ments in advocacy infrastructures survived and 
continued to have an impact. The design for this
evaluation will be delivered along with remaining
assets to the Tides Foundation. ■
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As the foundation moved toward its sunset, one question loomed especially large: How to best 
prepare grantees for the day when Beldon’s support ends? In a sense, this concern informed much
of Beldon’s grant making from the start. By providing core and capacity-building support to 
key groups early on, and attracting new funders, Beldon sought to strengthen organizations so
they would be well-positioned to thrive after the foundation closed its doors. But many grantees
were still heavily dependent on Beldon funds–for some, Beldon’s support represented more




EXPANDING GRANTEES’ DONOR BASE:
CAPACITY BUILDING, NOT EXIT GRANTS 
One option the foundation considered was to make big
“exit grants,” a strategy that was eventually discarded in
favor of building grantees’ fund-raising capacity. The
board reasoned that it was better to teach grantees to fish
for grants than to give them a giant grant. In 2003, 
nearly six years before the Beldon Fund was set to close,
the foundation launched a Fundraising Support Program
for a core set of grantees who were heavily dependent 
on Beldon’s support. 
FUND-RAISING SUPPORT PROGRAM 
Drawing from the Discretionary Fund, the foundation
sought to help grantees diversify their funding streams.
The fund-raising program kicked off with a three-day
intensive training, and continued with followup national
and regional fund-raising trainings for staff; peer-to-peer
gatherings; and supplemental funding for select organi-
zations to help them implement what they had learned
in the training sessions. These core grantees received
planning grants to develop multi-year strategies, with a
particular focus on increasing individual donors. All
plans included dollar benchmarks against which fund-
raising progress could be measured. Beldon had the
plans assessed by fund-raising experts before committing
resources. 
The Fund-Raising Support Program was mostly 
successful. By Beldon’s last year, a number of grantees,
especially those in the Key States Program, had made
great strides. They improved their data management 
systems, created better processes for communicating
with donors, and were involving more board members 
in fund raising.
Although only a few grantees had fully replaced Beldon’s
funding, most were able to diversify their income
streams– including significantly expanded support from
individual donors–and had created much stronger fund-
raising cultures within their organizations. And while
groups still faced challenges–staff turnover, lower giving
rates as the economy cooled and shifting organizational
profiles–most were well on their way.
COMMUNICATING TO NEW GRANT
APPLICANTS 
While Beldon succeeded in helping to position grantees to
thrive after its exit, the foundation neglected in its final
years to communicate clearly to new grant applicants. By
year six, Beldon had established its strategies and core
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grantees and was very focused on completing its work,
with little interest in adding new grantees. But it respected
John Hunting’s commitment to keeping an open door.
This sent a conflicting message that created confusion,
and some resentment, among declined applicants. 
In retrospect, it would have been wiser to explicitly state
a cutoff date for letters of inquiry. The foundation could
then have considered other options to keep the door ajar,
such as Request For Proposals or a by-invitation-only
approach. ■
THE BELDON FUND’S RESPONSIBLE EXITING PRINCIPLES
1. Communicate Clearly with Grantees. Beldon gave ample notice of its impending sunset and
provided the resources grantees needed to plan for their futures beyond 2008.
2. Begin Early to Position Grantees for Exit. Beldon provided long-term general support that
strengthened grantee organizations and better positioned them to attract other sources of funding. 
3. Help Grantees Find New Funding. Beldon supported training that bolstered grantees’ 
fund-raising skills and it played an active role helping grantees connect with other funders. 
4. Establish Expertise that Will Attract Other Funders. By sharing its expertise about trends in
the field and effective strategies and demonstrating through its own grant making the viability
of new approaches, Beldon was able to draw other funders into supporting this work.
5. Structure Final Grants to Prepare Grantees for Transition. By offering matching or challenge
grants one to two years before Beldon’s exit, and by tapering its support, the foundation
encouraged grantees to develop new sources of funding.
6. Encourage Grantees to Forecast in Anticipation of Your Exit. Knowing that denial is 
a powerful mechanism, Beldon asked all grantees to provide with their final grant request 
a multi-year income and expense budget showing how they planned to fill the gap left by
Beldon’s exit. Most grantees indicated that they intended to bank a portion of their final 
grants to ease their transition to other sources of funding. 
7. Set a Cutoff Date for Accepting New Grant Letters of Inquiry and Communicate it Early.
Beldon had neglected to clearly communicate its cutoff date, engendering confusion—and 
some resentment—among rejected grant applicants. 
8. Maximize Impact by Sharing Lessons. In its final year, Beldon sought to capture its story, 
distill useful lessons and develop a strategy to share this information. The purpose was to
inform and influence funding and advocacy practices in the field going forward. In retrospect,
the foundation concluded it would have been wise to conduct this kind of communications
throughout its lifetime. But an exit provides a compelling opportunity to distill insights gleaned
from the entire arc of your grant making. 
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CONCLUSION: PLACING BIG BETS, 
BUT TIME WILL TELL
The Beldon Fund’s decision to spend out its $100-million
endowment was a big bet on an ambitious theory 
of change: that by investing all of its resources over 
a 10-year period, the foundation could move the needle
on shaping environmental policy. So far, results on the
ground and external assessments indicate that this 
bet is paying off. In the field of environmental health, 
the issues championed by Beldon and its grantees have
attracted public attention and led to policy changes.
Powerful new allies have emerged and more funders are
supporting environmental health issues. The state-level
environmental advocacy groups funded by Beldon have
greatly increased their power and influence over the past
ten years. Beldon grantees in Michigan, Minnesota,
Wisconsin, and North Carolina, for instance, have led
successful state-level campaigns for clean drinking water,
power plant regulation and landfill legislation.
Practically speaking, the 1998 decision to set a clear end
date created a set of unique challenges. Because of
Beldon’s programmatic commitments, for instance, the
foundation had to create an investment strategy that
delivered predictable returns and low volatility. Likewise,
the foundation created a rigorous process of forecasting
and budgeting for expenses. The goal was to adjust
investment strategy to ensure a smooth financial land-
ing–while also meeting the foundation’s aggressive
grant-making goals.
At the same time, Beldon’s spend out placed different
operational demands on the organization. Foremost, the
foundation ended up hiring a greater number of senior-
level staff members to plan and implement its program
agenda. This was partly because the cutting-edge work
that Beldon funded–environmental health, state-level
policy advocacy and sophisticated civic engagement
IN THEIR OWN WORDS
Grantee Perspective 
In an anonymous Grantee Perception Survey
conducted by the Center for Effective
Philanthropy (CEP) in February/March 2008, 
84 percent of respondents reported that Beldon
provided assistance securing funding from other
sources. In addition, more than 75 percent of
grantees indicated that after 2008 they expected
to continue the work funded by Beldon in the
same or slightly modified form. (CEP survey is
available at www.beldon.org.)
“Beldon gave us ample warning and helped us
deal with their closing down. . .They did a great
job of putting us through fund-raising training
and then provided a grant to build our donor
program. And their convening of peer to 
peer meetings has been very helpful to our 
continuing this work going forward.”
“There are a lot of organizations that are going
to miss the money from Beldon, but there is
actually more trepidation about how to replace
the role Beldon played in the marketplace. 
If Beldon cut funding significantly, but still
played the other roles that it plays, the 
anxiety about them leaving would go down.”
“The fundraising support program made all the
difference for us. It was our roadmap for life
without Beldon... I don’t wake up at two in the
morning worried about how I’ll survive.”
strategies – required top-shelf professionals to develop
and manage. Having senior-level staff on board also 
eliminated the learning curve usually required for less
experienced program officers, an important advantage
given Beldon’s limited time frame to get things right.
This high-stakes grant making attracted professionals
who welcomed Beldon’s vibrant, entrepreneurial culture.
It also helped that Beldon paid people well and went out
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of its way to clearly communicate plans for staff attrition.
Programmatically, the decision to spend out forced the
foundation to narrow its strategy – to make bigger bets
in fewer areas. But taking bigger risks also led Beldon
to invest in frequent evaluations so the foundation
could make mid-course corrections quickly. In the final
few years, the foundation also developed strategies to
ensure that the work it supported would continue after
the foundation’s exit, investing heavily in bolstering
grantees’ fund-raising capacity and in attracting other
funders to the field.
While Beldon is encouraged by the success of its strate-
gies, the full impact of the foundation’s grant making
will not be known for several more years. In the short
1  The first Beldon Fund (Beldon Fund I), based in Washington DC, disbursed $200,000 to $300,000 per year to environmental policy and 
advocacy groups. The Fund’s first three directors were: Judy Donald, Diane Ives, and Catherine Lerza. The major infusion of funds following
the sale of Steelcase stock launched what was in effect a new foundation (Beldon Fund II), which moved its base of operations to New York.
2  Beldon’s key states program began in 1999 with six states that included New Mexico. The 2001 external assessment recommended a tighter
program focus across the board. As a result, Beldon reduced the number of program areas, and went from six states to five where it believed
the opportunities were ripest for change. New Mexico grantees were given two-year exit grants to ease the transition.
3  All grantee quotes in this monograph are from confidential interviews and survey.
term, it’s clear that Beldon’s ability to make large, 
multi-year grants to environmental health advocates and
to state-based environmental advocacy groups–grants
that far surpassed what the foundation could have done
if it were funding for perpetuity–has altered the 
landscape in the areas the foundation targeted. As the
coalitions it helped build broaden and deepen and the
policies the foundation helped advance come to fruition
over the coming years, the depth and breadth of 
Beldon’s influence will become more clear. 
For now, Beldon’s legacy can be measured in the victories
it helped catalyze, the organizations and coalitions it 
has strengthened, the fields it has seeded and the new
funders it has brought to this work.
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INTERVIEW WITH JOHN HUNTING 
Q: How did you first get involved in philanthropy?
A: When I was six years old, my father gave me stock in a
small company he co-founded in Grand Rapids, Michigan
that eventually became Steelcase, the world's largest
manufacturer of office equipment. In my 30’s I started
giving away 50% or more of my income to charities and
progressive causes. My theory has always been that a 
lot of people have great ideas—the missing ingredient is
money, and that’s what I can provide.
I created the Dyer-Ives Foundation to support youth and
neighborhood improvement projects in Grand Rapids.
Then I got very involved in environmental issues and
started the Beldon Fund as a national foundation to help
strengthen environmental advocacy and to build support
for policy change.
Q: Why did you decide to set a 10-year time horizon 
for the Beldon Fund?
A: When Steelcase went public in 1997, I was able to give
most of the proceeds from the sale of my stock—over
$100 million—to the Beldon Fund and I decided at that
time to give it all away quickly. As an environmentalist, I
felt that given the state of the world it would be inexcus-
able not to try to make a difference by spending out now.
Q: What are the Beldon Fund accomplishments 
you are most proud of?
A: I think Beldon’s programs helped strengthen environ-
mental advocates so they are now much better positioned
to take advantage of policy opportunities and respond 
to new environmental threats. I’m proud of what our
grantees were able to accomplish in a difficult political
environment. They have won scores of state policy 
victories, which helped build momentum for reform of
national policies.
Q: Looking back, what would you have done differently?
A: When we started out we made the mistake of taking 
on too many issues. All of us—staff and board—are com-
mitted environmentalists, and when you want to bring
change you can sometimes end up biting off more than
you can chew. An external evaluation two years into 
this work made it clear that we were spread too thin to 
be effective. So we whittled down to two programs and
created a third flexible fund for opportunistic grants. 
Q: What advice would you give other funders?
A: The first bit of advice is to hire a good executive 
director and pay him or her well. If the executive director
has plenty of stuff on the ball, he or she will find other
good people to hire. I would also urge foundations to put
on their board people who are knowledgeable about 
their issues. 
Second, for foundations that are just beginning, we
learned that it’s better to start with a tight focus and
expand if warranted, rather than start with too many
issues and then have to reduce them. Third, if you want to
influence public policies, it’s important to fund the full
range of advocacy that nonprofits are allowed to pursue.
Even though these are totally permissible activities, I
know there is still some caution among foundations. So
my advice is to involve a good lawyer who understands
the law on foundations and advocacy, and then jump in. 
Fourth, one of my little pet theories is that money is not
always the most important thing a foundation offers. 
You can be a convener, a sounding board for ideas, and 
a broker between effective organizations and other 
funders. I think it’s also important to promote collabora-
tion among foundations, which makes all of our work
more effective.
Finally, the Beldon Fund tried to make a difference by
committing all its resources over ten years, and that
allowed us to make big investments in a few key strategies.
Even if you don’t want to choose the spend-out path, try
not to get locked into the five percent payout. Consider 
a more flexible funding cycle that would allow you to
meet timely needs in the field and to take advantage of
opportunities to have a greater impact. 
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Let’s consider our world not as 
inherited from our parents, 
but as borrowed from our children. 
Kenyan Proverb
